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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 2000013 5-CA

vs.
VALERIE D. THOMPSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for violation of the compulsory
education laws in the Seventh Judicial Juvenile Court, Emery County, the Honorable
Scott N. Johansen presiding. Defendant's conviction was based on her failure to
respond to a written request for parental support in securing regular school
attendance by a minor, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53A-11-101(3) (2000).
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Joint proceedings. Is defendant, who agreed to the juvenile court's joint
proceedings, entitled to appellate review of her joinder claim?
A claim not raised below can only be reviewed for plain error. See State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). However, review for plain error does not
lie when a party has consciously refrained from objecting, thereby inviting error.
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989).
2. Joint representation. Did the juvenile court commit plain error by not
inquiring into a potential conflict of interest from defense counsel's representation
of both defendant and her daughter when no conflict of interest was apparent?
To prevail on the unpreserved claim of court error, defendant must meet the
plain error standard. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel-trial performance. Did defendant
demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently in his conduct at trial and, if so,
did his deficiency result in prejudice?
An ineffective assistance claim raises questions of law. See State v.
Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20, 984 P.2d 376, 379; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50
(Utah 1998). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
that her counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that counsel's deficient
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performance prejudiced [her]." Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). She must "identify specific acts or omissions that fell outside
the wide range of professional assistance and illustrate that, absent those acts or
omissions, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Because defendant made no objection at
trial, she must show an actual, not possible, conflict. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 347-48 (1980). Further, in reviewing trial counsel's performance, the
court must "indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,
186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
4. Sufficiency of the evidence. Should the court review defendant's
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence when she has not marshaled the
evidence?
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain
the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made." State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 879 (1992). "Because the trial court
ha[s] the opportunity to view the[] witnesses and weigh their credibility, we defer to
its findings unless the record demonstrates clear error." Id. at 880. To prevail on a
claim of insufficient evidence, a defendant must first marshal all the evidence that

3

supports the trial court's findings and then show how this marshaled evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, is insufficient to support
the trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, rules, and statutes are
reproduced in Addendum A:
§ 53A-11-101 (2000)
§ 53A-11-103 (2000)
§ 77-8a(l) (1999)
§ 78-3a-l 15(2) (Supp. 2000)
Utah R. Crim. P. 12

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
Defendant was charged with a compulsory education violation, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 53 A-11-101(3) (2000), for
refusing to respond to written requests by the local school district for assistance in
securing her daughter's regular attendance at school. R. 1. Defendant's daughter
Elise had missed more than 150 days of school over the preceding two years, largely
without parental notification or excuse to the school. See R. 26: 6-7, 13; State
Exhibits 1-3. Defendant retained counsel and appeared for trial on January 20,
2000. R. 26:1.
The court scheduled trials for defendant and her daughter for the same day.
R. 26:3-5. Defense counsel, who represented both defendant and her daughter,
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arrived for trial confused about the status of Elise's truancy charges. Elise had been
charged with truancy for both the 1998-1999 and the 1999-2000 school years.
Defense counsel apparently believed that the 1998-1999 school year truancy count
had already been adjudicated. R. 26:2-3. In fact, the court had ruled only that Elise
had failed to comply with the terms of a diversion agreement addressing her
truancies; it had not ruled on the 1998-1999 truancy charge itself. R. 26:2-4. The
second truancy charge for absences during November and December, 1999, had
been sent to the district attorney for screening.
Consequently, the court had before it Elise's 1998-99 school year truancy
charge and defendant's November-December 1999 compulsory education violation.
Despite his confusion about Elise's status, defense counsel never expressed any
confusion regarding the charge against defendant.
The juvenile court explained that the court would be trying Elise's truancy as
well as the charges against defendant. R. 26:2. The court then asked defense
counsel whether he had any objection to taking all of the testimony at once and then
separating the two cases at argument. Defendant agreed that the suggested
procedure was "okay." Id. Testimony on both matters was taken at once, and any
necessary differentiation between the matters was made in closing argument.
R. 26:6.

5

Defendant testified at trial that her daughter is a "brittle diabetic" who suffers
sudden, life-threatening episodes of diabetic ketoacidosis caused by abnormally high
blood sugars. R. 26:41. She ascribed most of Elise's absences to her illness.
R. 26:61-63. Defendant claimed that she called in excuses for many of Elise's
illnesses, but could not say whether she called in more often than the school records
showed. R. 26:63-64. Defendant claimed that she tried to contact Merlin Weber,
the school principal, by phone numerous times over the year, without success.
R. 26:57-58.
The State introduced exhibits showing that Elise had missed approximately
ninety of the first 134 days of the 1998-1999 school year. See State's Exhibit 1.
School records indicated that approximately seventy of the absences were
unexcused. Id. During the ninety-day fall semester beginning in August 1999, Elise
had missed sixty-four full days and parts of eight other days. See State's Exhibits 2
& 3. Over forty of the days were unexcused. Id.
Principal Weber testified that he had complied with district policies in sending
certified letters to defendant following Elise's lack of attendance in the 1998-99
school year. R. 26:6-8, 10. The letters sought a conference with defendant to
discuss the situation. R. 26:8. Defendant met with the principal on November 19,
1998, and a plan was arranged that made allowances for Elise's health problems,
including allowing her to complete assignments at home. R. 26:9-10, 30-31.
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Continued unexcused absences after this meeting prompted involvement of a
mediation counsel.1 R. 26:10. However, despite written notice, neither defendant
nor her daughter appeared for the appointment before the counsel, prompting a
referral to the juvenile court. R. 26:10. A home study program was eventually
arranged for the remainder of the year. R. 26:22-26. However, either defendant or
Elise canceled eight of the eighteen scheduled study meetings. R. 26:35-36.
In the 1999-2000 school year, the problem continued. R. 26:11-13.
Defendant did not arrange for a home study program pursuant to district policy, and
she did not call in daily to excuse Elise's absences. R. 26:13, 20, 26-27, 37.
School attendance records show that Elise had missed more than sixty-four of the
first ninety days of the 1999-2000 school year and that forty-one of her full-day
absences were unexcused. State's Exhibits 2 & 3.
Principal Weber testified that he sent defendant a letter asking her to "please
come in and let[']s talk about how to solve the problem" as well as three "excessive
absences citation[s]." R. 26:13-14. All correspondence went by certified mail. See
State's Exhibit 4, attached in Addendum B.

l

When attendance problems cannot be resolved at the school or district level,
Emery County School District refers truant students and their parents to a mediation
council that includes representatives from the Division of Child and Family Services, the
school district, the local interagency council, and the juvenile court. Notice of the
meeting cautions that students will be referred to juvenile court for truancy if they do not
attend their scheduled mediation meeting. See Defendant's Exhibit 9, attached in
Addendum B.
7

In the first letter dated November 15, 1999, but apparently mailed and
received together with the first excessive absence citation, the principal expressed
his concerns about Elise's lack of attendance and unexcused absences. See State's
Exhibits 4, 6, attached in Addendum B. He stated that the school had been able to
accommodate other students with serious diabetic problems and asked defendant to
"[p]lease come in and let[']s talk about how to solve the problem." State's
Exhibit 6.
The first excessive absence citation, dated November 19, stated:
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student
has three (3) unexcused absences. State law requires the
parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular attendance of
their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor
charge being filed against the parent/guardian.
District policy requires that one or both parents/guardians attend a
meeting with the school principal/assistant principal to discuss their
student[']s attendance problem before the student is allowed to return to
school. Please contact the school as soon as possible to schedule a date
and time.
State's Exhibit 5, attached in Addendum B. In the citation's comment section,
Principal Weber had written, "Elise really has 14 unexcused absences because no
one has called to excuse her for some time." Id.
On November 24, Mr. Weber sent defendant a letter discussing homework
assignments and unexcused absences. State's Exhibit 7, attached in Addendum B.
Atttached was a second excessive absence citation again notifying defendant of the
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state law requiring parents to assist the school in securing regular attendance of their
children and again warning that failure to do so can result in a class B
misdemeanor. See id.
On December 1, Mr. Weber sent another letter discussing his willingness to
help accommodate Elise and attaching a third excessive absence citation. This
citation notified defendant that Elise was being referred to juvenile court.
When asked to comment on the result of his correspondence, Mr. Weber
testified that he knew of only two phone calls defendant made to the school. He
testified that he returned these calls and spoke to defendant's son, identifying
himself and stating that defendant was trying to reach him. He "spelled out a little
note" when he returned the second call. R. 26:20. To his knowledge, defendant
made no other attempts to contact him. R. 26:19. Elise's unexcused absences did
not improve. R. 26:13-14, 20.
Defendant testified that she tried to contact the principal by phone numerous
times without success. R. 26:57-58, 61. She testified to numerous trips to the
hospital occasioned by Elise's illness, but agreed with medical records showing inpatient stays at Castle View Hospital totaling only approximately four days during
the fall 1998 semester. R. 26:61, 67-68. She testified to an additional five-day nonemergency stay at Cottonwood Hospital in the early fall, but offered no additional
hospital records for that year. She offered no hospital records for 1999. She
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obtained letters from at least three doctors regarding Elise's illness. R. 26:52. Two
of them believed that Elise was able to attend school during 1998, and one of the
two thought Elise had a phobia or exhibited school avoidance behavior by using her
diabetes as a means of regularly missing school. R. 26:69, 70. Defendant had no
medical letters relating to 1999. She admitted that she did not call the school to
excuse absences daily, but stated that she called periodically to say things had not
changed, that Elise was ill, or that Elise was back in the hospital. R. 26:51-52, 64.
She testified that she had urged the school to gather homework assignments for
Elise, but that some teachers refused. R. 26:58-59. However, she admitted that
during 1999 she picked up homework for Elise only two or three times. R. 26:70.
The trial judge found defendant to be less than credible and found her guilty
of the compulsory education violation. R. 14-15; 26:82-83, 92-93. He sentenced
defendant to six months in the Emery County Detention Center and imposed a $500
fine. He suspended all but two days of the term and placed defendant on probation
for one year. R. 14-15.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 19. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for
remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to determine whether
her counsel was ineffective. This court denied the motion.

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Joint proceedings. Because defendant agreed to the juvenile court's
hearing testimony concurrently on the truancy matter and the compulsory education
violation, she cannot obtain appellate review on this issue. Further, any error was
harmless.
2. Joint representation. Because defendant did not raise the issue, the
juvenile court did not have an affirmative duty to investigate potential conflicts of
interest. Any error was neither obvious nor harmful. Defendant's claim that her
counsel was ineffective for representing both mother and daughter requires a
demonstration of actual conflict. Defendant has identified no actual conflict and has
demonstrated no prejudice.
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel-trial performance. Despite trial
counsel's initial confusion regarding the daughter's truancies, his performance was
not deficient. Defendant has not identified any specific acts or omissions that fall
outside the wide range of professional assistance and has not illustrated prejudice.
4. Sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant has not met her burden to
properly marshal the evidence relevant to this claim. In any event, the clear weight
of the evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that every element of
the offense, including refusal to respond to a written request that included the
statutorily mandated notice, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Defendant's alternative argument-that she did indeed comply with the school's
requests-also fails. The juvenile court disbelieved defendant's testimony about her
attempts to contact the school. The credibility determination is not clearly
erroneous. Rather, it is consistent with the clear weight of the evidence presented at
trial.
ARGUMENT
Point I
If the juvenile court erred by holding joint proceedings, defendant invited
that error. In any event, defendant has demonstrated no harm.
Defendant claims that the juvenile court plainly erred when it took evidence
on defendant's compulsory education violation at the same time it took evidence on
her daughter's 1998-99 truancies. Defendant invited any error by affirmatively
agreeing to the proposed procedure. In any event, defendant has failed to
demonstrate harm.
A.

No error occurred.

To support her argument, defendant relies on UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8al(3)(a) (1999), which governs joinder of cases in criminal proceedings. Defendant's
reliance on this section is misplaced. First, defendant's case and her daughter's case
were never joined. The juvenile court merely received testimony on both matters at
the same time, but kept the cases separate for argument and for disposition. Second,
section 77-8a-l(3)(a) applies only to cases charged by information. Elise's case was
12

not charged by information. Her truancy petition was not a criminal matter and
therefore was not governed by the criminal procedure code.
Arguably, the more applicable section is UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-l 15(2)
(Supp. 2000), a provision of the juvenile court code, which states that "[m]inor's
cases shall be heard separately from adult cases." Defendant did not argue this
provision below nor has she on appeal. This court ordinarily does not consider
issues sua sponte that have not been raised on appeal. State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d
1228 (Ut. App. 1992). Therefore, defendant cannot rely on this provision.2
B. Defendant invited any error.
Even if hearing the testimony together were error, defendant invited that error
by agreeing to the procedure. It is well established that absent plain error, an
appellant may not claim error on appeal when she did not timely object below.
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); State v. Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29, 35
(Utah). The plain error doctrine "exists to permit review of trial court rulings as a
way of protecting a defendant from the harm that can be caused by less-than-perfect
counsel." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159 (Utah 1989). Plain error review, however, does
not lie when a party, through counsel, consciously refrains from objecting or has led

2

In any event, the juvenile court merely took evidence on the two matters together,
but kept them separate for argument and disposition. The cases were therefore "heard
separately" for purposes of the statute. Also, the juvenile court code's provision that
"[mjinor's cases shall be heard separately from adult cases" is for the benefit of the
minor, not the adult. Therefore, defendant, who is an adult, cannot complain.
13

the trial court into error. Id.; Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. Thus, "'invited error' ... is
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially where ample
opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result.'" State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1275, 1284-85 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah
1987)). Otherwise, a criminal defendant could "invite" prejudicial error and
"implant it in the record as a form of appellate insurance ...." Id.
Here, defendant did not request a severance of the two matters. Rather, when
the juvenile court asked whether defendant had "any objections [to] taking all the
testimony at once and ... separating] at argument," defense counsel affirmatively
agreed to the proposed procedure. R. 26:2. If any error occurred, defendant
consciously agreed to the error, thereby inviting it. Defendant is therefore precluded
from obtaining appellate review on this issue. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 343.
C. In any event, defendant has not demonstrated harm.
In any event, defendant has not shown how she was harmed by the court's
taking evidence on both cases at the same time. Defendant was not tried before a
jury. Defendant's trial was scheduled back to back with her daughter's truancy
adjudication. Because the two matters were closely connected and required
testimony from the same witnesses, the judge elected, with defendant's consent, to
receive testimony on both matters at the same time, then to address and rule on each
matter in succession. Thus, if defendant had not agreed to the procedure, the court
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could have received the testimony regarding both matters in quick succession.
Defendant does not explain, nor can she, how that alternative procedure would have
benefitted her.
A judge often presides over and hears testimony in related matters involving
multiple defendants. Still, he may serve as the trier of fact in any one or more of
those matters. The judicial system presumes that he can ignore evidence not before
him, even if otherwise relevant, and apply only the evidence properly admitted in
the matter he is adjudicating. Cf. People v. Daniels, 415 N.W.2d 282, 285 (1987)
(despite general rule that a defendant must be allowed to wear civilian clothes at
trial, no prejudicial effect if tried before a judge rather than a jury); State v. Collins,
495 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (same); People v. Zapata, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171
(Cal. App. 1963) (error to require defendant be tried in jail clothing, but harmless at
bench trial).
That presumption applies in the instant case. Presumably, the trial judge here
was competent to apply the evidence properly admissible in defendant's case.
Presumably, he was also capable of sorting through the evidence and considering
only evidence properly admissible in defendant's case. Defendant has pointed to no
evidence admitted in this joint proceeding that could not have been admitted had
defendant been tried in a separate trial. Nor has she pointed to any evidence that
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the trial court impermissibly relied on in finding her guilty. Any error is therefore
harmless.
Point II
Absent any objection, the juvenile court had no affirmative
duty to investigate potential conflicts of interest. If any error
occurred, it was neither obvious nor harmful. Because defendant
has demonstrated no actual conflict, she cannot prevail
on her related ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Defendant claims that the juvenile court plainly erred when it permitted
defense counsel to represent both defendant and her daughter. Neither defendant
nor defense counsel requested that the court require defendant to retain separate
counsel for herself or for her daughter. No objection was made to defense counsel's
representation of both parties. Defendant must therefore establish plain error: that
(1) error occurred, (2) the error was obvious, and (3) the error was harmful. See
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant did not meet this standard. The court did not
err. If the court did err, its error was neither obvious nor harmful. Furthermore,
trial counsel's joint representation of mother and daughter did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.
A.

The juvenile court had no duty to initiate an inquiry into the propriety
of defense counsel's joint representation.
"Requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often

referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees
of effective assistance of counsel." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S., 475, 481
16

(1978). In fact, in some cases, joint representation may foster certain advantages.
"A common defense often gives strength against a common attack." Holloway, 435
U.S. at 483 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the absence of an objection to multiple representation, "a reviewing court
cannot presume that the possibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance
of counsel." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). "[T]he Sixth
Amendment [does not] require[] state courts ... to initiate inquiries into the propriety
of multiple representation in every case." Id. at 346. "Unless the trial court knows
or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not
initiate an inquiry." Id. at 347.
Defendant acknowledges that the issue of conflict was not raised at trial. See
Br. Aplt. at 11. Therefore, defendant's reliance on State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190
(Utah App. 1991), is misplaced. In Velarde, defendants raised objections to a
potential conflict of interest at trial, the trial court failed to investigate, and this
court presumed prejudice. However, the Velarde standard, also detailed in
Holloway, is not applicable in the absence of an objection. See Cuyler, 445 U.S. at
345-48 (holding that "a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance"). As
stated in Velarde, "[T]rial courts need not investigate every possible nuance
surrounding a potential conflict of interest, nor do they have an affirmative duty to
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initiate an investigation into such matters when not raised ...." 806 P.2d at 1193.
Thus, the question is whether the trial court knew or reasonably should have known
that a conflict of interest existed.
Here, the juvenile court had no way of knowing that a conflict existed. Both
defendant and Elise raised Elise's illness as a common defense. Nothing in the
record suggests any particular conflict that should have been apparent to the court.
Even in arguing this issue on appeal, defendant has not specified what conflict
might have existed or what other defense she would have raised if she had been
represented by separate counsel. In view of the foregoing, the juvenile court did not
err in not initiating an inquiry into any potential conflicts of interest.
B.

Defendant has not established that the juvenile court plainly erred when
it permitted defense counsel's joint representation.
Even if there were error, the error was not obvious. No precedent has

established that a court must require separate representation for a minor in a truancy
adjudication and a parent on trial for a compulsory education violation based on the
minor's truancy.
Any error was also harmless. Defendant has not alleged that counsel
represented her less than faithfully because of his joint representation of her
daughter. She has not detailed how counsel's joint representation prejudiced her
common defense. Nothing suggests that the court's failure to require separate
counsel harmed defendant.
18

C.

Defense counsel's joint representation did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Defendant also seeks review of this claim by alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel. Defendant claims that trial counsel's failure to request a recess, discuss
the nature of the proceedings with defendants, and advise them of the potential
conflicts constituted ineffective representation. Aplt. Br. at 16. Because new
counsel represents defendant in this appeal and because this court has previously
denied defendant's Rule 23B motion, review may proceed on the record established
in the juvenile court. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ff 17-18, 405 Utah Adv.
Rep. 14.
"In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who
raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. "[T]he
possibility of conflict is insufficient...." Id. at 350.
As stated, defendant has identified no actual conflict. Defendant merely
states that defense counsel should have advised defendant and her daughter of "the
potential conflict." Br. Aplt. at 15. This is not a case where co-defendants might
raise conflicting defenses, one implicating the other, or where the prosecution has
offered one co-defendant a plea bargain in exchange for her testimony against
another co-defendant. Nor is it a case where testimony by one defendant might
disadvantage the other. Rather, defendant and her daughter both argued that Elise's
19

absences were the result of illness. This case was, in fact, among those where "[a]
common defense often gives strength against a common attack." Holloway, 435
U.S. at 483 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant has
demonstrated no actual conflict.
Nor has defendant demonstrated that any "conflict of interest adversely
affected [her] lawyer's performance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. Indeed, defendant
has not pointed to a single instance where her defense counsel's performance was
affected in any manner by the joint representation. Consequently, she has not met
her burden of showing an actul conflict of interest or that her counsel's performance
was adversely affected.
Point III
Defense counsel's performance at trial was not deficient.
Defendant has identified no specific acts or omissions demonstrating
deficiency and has not demonstrated prejudice,
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was deficient in his lack of
preparation. While trial counsel was confused about the status of the Elise's truancy
adjudication, he was aware of the background associated with both the truancy
matter and the misdemeanor charge, and he was prepared to undertake defendant's
trial. Nothing in the record suggests that counsel was confused about defendant's
case or that he was unprepared to try it. If counsel was confused and if the
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confusion diminished his performance in any way, the harm went to Elise, not her
mother.
An ineffective assistance claim must show both "that counsel's performance
was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, a defendant must identify "specific acts
or omissions that fell outside the wide range of professional assistance." Maestas,
1999 UT 32, f 20, 984 P.2d at 379 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant here has identified none. Nor does the record demonstrate that trial
counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate prejudice. Defendant has not
illustrated that absent trial counsel's initial confusion about Elise's case, there would
have been a "reasonable probability of a more favorable result" in her own case. Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Having alleged no specific errors,
defendant cannot argue prejudice on any other basis.
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Point IV
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence on her
insufficiency of the evidence claim. In any event, the
evidence sufficed to support a conviction on all elements
of the offense, including statutorily mandated notice.
Defendant claims that the juvenile court erred in convicting her upon
insufficient evidence of all the elements of the crime. Specifically, defendant claims
that the notice sent her from the school was inadequate under the statute. Defendant
alleges that the notice was deficient because requests came from the school principal
rather than from the school district or the school board and because requests did not
state that refusal to respond was a class B misdemeanor. She alleges that she
received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to raise this
issue. In the alternative, defendant argues that she did respond to the school's
requests.
Defendant has not marshaled the evidence nor demonstrated that the trial
court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. Consequently, her
claim that counsel was inadequate for failure to argue insufficiency fails. Finally,
her argument that she did, indeed, comply is also a challenge to sufficiency of the
evidence. Again, the clear weight of the evidence supports the juvenile court's
finding that defendant did not comply with the school's request for assistance.
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A.

Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence.
A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence must first marshal the

evidence supporting the trial court's decision. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17
n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. She must then show that, viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling, the trial court's findings are against the clear
weight of the evidence and therefore clearly erroneous. State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878,
879 (1992). "Because the trial court had the opportunity to view the[] witnesses and
weigh their credibility, [the reviewing court] defer[s] to its findings unless the
record demonstrates clear error." Id. at 880.
Marshaling requires the defendant to gather all the evidence that supports the
verdict and then explain how that evidence is not enough to sustain the conviction.
See Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, at f 17 n.2. Defendant has not met this burden. She
avoids mention of the number of absences, excused or unexcused. She never details
the citations warning defendant of potential misdemeanor charges. Defendant does
not recite testimony that two of Elise's three doctors had written letters indicating
that Elise was able to attend school despite her illness. Defendant's statement of
facts reduces the evidence supporting the court's judgment to a single brief
paragraph. See Br. Aplt. at 5. Defendant's argument summarizes only a few pieces
of evidence favorable to her. See id. at 16-21.
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"[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have pertinent
excepts from the record readily available to a reviewing court." West Valley City v.
Majestic Investment Ca, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). Rather,
"[c]ounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume
the adversary's position," by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the appellant resists." Id. After gathering "this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id.
Given defendant's complete failure to marshal the evidence, this court should
simply affirm her conviction.
B.

Evidence sufficed to support a conviction on all elements of the offense.
Should this court excuse defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, it

should nevertheless affirm because the evidence amply supports defendant's
compulsory education violation. A careful review of the record demonstrates that
evidence sufficed to support the trial court's determination with respect to every
element of the compulsory educatioh offense.
Utah law provides that the knowing "refus[al] to respond to a written request
which is delivered to the parent pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 53A-11103(l)(b) by a local school board or school district" is a class B misdemeanor.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 53A-11-101(3). Subsection 53A-1 l-103(l)(b) requires the
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school board or district to make efforts to resolve a minor's school attendance
problems, including, as feasible, "a written request for parental support in securing
regular attendance by the minor delivered by certified mail, containing notice of the
requirements of this section and stating that refusal to respond to the notice is a
class B misdemeanor."
Notice in this case was adequate. Despite defendant's arguments to the
contrary, nothing in the statute suggests that the school board or district cannot
operate through its agents and employees, including school principals, in complying
with the statutory mandate to seek parental support in securing a minor's regular
school attendance. The statute imposes a duty on the board or district to make
efforts to resolve a minor's attendance problems, including, "as reasonably
feasible," counseling, meeting with the minor and the parents, adjusting the
curriculum and schedule where necessary to meet special needs, monitoring school
attendance, and making the written request for parental support at issue in this case.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 53A-11-103(1). Neither the board nor district could feasibly

undertake these responsibilities for each truant student in each school within the
district without working through school administrators and employees. The district
may make the written request for parental support through the school principal just
as it would monitor attendance and adjust curriculum and schedules through the
principal and other school employees. Defendant cites no contrary authority.
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Defendant claims that the letter written November 15, 1999, State's Exhibit
6, did not meet the statutory notice requirements even though it did ask her to
"please come in and let[]s talk about the problem." See Br. Aplt. at 19. Defendant
apparently argues that the letter was inadequate because it did not specify potential
misdemeanor liability. However, defendant fails to note that she received three
excessive absence citations in addition to the letter and that two of them detailed the
misdemeanor liability.
The first, dated November 19 and apparently mailed with the November 15
letter, stated:
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student has
three (3) unexcused absences. State law requires the parent/guardian
to assist the school in securing regular attendance of their child and
failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being filed
against the parent/guardian.
State's Exhibit 5. The second citation, included under a cover letter dated
November 24, also advised defendant of the potential misdemeanor charge. State's
Exhibit 7. The third citation, together with a cover letter dated December 1,
followed. This correspondence did not repeat the misdemeanor warning, but
notified defendant that Elise was being referred to juvenile court and again
requested that defendant "call for a time to come in and work out a schedule that
will work for Elise." State's Exhibit 8. All correspondence was sent by certified
mail. See State's Exhibit 4.
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The first citation by itself was sufficient to meet the notice requirements of
the law. The citation requested defendant's help. It expressly stated that state law
required the parent to assist the school and cautioned that failure to do so could
result in a class B misdemeanor. The following correspondence contained
additional requests for help and an additional warning that refusal to help could
result in misdemeanor charges.
Notice was thus adequate. The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial
court's conclusion that defendant refused to respond to a written request that
included the statutorily mandated notice. Therefore, both defendant's insufficiency
argument and her corollary argument that defense counsel was deficient for failure
to raise the issue fail.
Defendant argues, in the alternative, that she did comply with the request for
her assistance. This too is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. When
asked to comment on the result of his correspondence, the school principal testified
that he knew of only two phone calls defendant made to the school. He testified
that he returned these calls and spoke to defendant's son, identifying himself and
stating that defendant was trying to reach him. He "spelled out a little note" when
he returned the second call. R. 26:20. Defendant testified that she tried to contact
the principal by phone numerous times without success. R. 26:57-58.
The court found that defendant's testimony was not credible:
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The evidence is clear that the written request was made and I
believe Mr. We[]ber when he says there was no response. I do not
believe the mother when she says that she called many times and just
[couldn't] get through to Mr. We[]ber. I just, I don't believe that is
credible evidence.
On review, a trial court's findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277 at f4,
405 Utah Adv. Rep. 55.
The juvenile court did not clearly err when, faced with contradictory
testimony, it found the principal credible and the mother not credible. The record
demonstrates numerous inconsistencies in defendant's testimony that undermine her
credibility. Despite her testimony of "sit[ting] up in ICU time after time" and of
hospital stays so frequent that "the days r[a]n together in [her] mind," defendant
conceded that certified hospital records indicated Castle View Hospital stays during
the 1998-1999 school year of just two days in August and two in December.
R. 26:66-68. Her only other testimony of hospitalization that school year was a
five-day non-emergency stay at Cottonwood Hospital in the early fall-probably in
September. R. 26:65-66, 69. She presented no hospital records for the 1999-2000
school year. Defendant testified to her visits to at least three doctors in connection
with Elise's illness. R. 26:52-53. On cross-examination, she conceded that one of
them thought that Elise could attend school and another believed that Elise had "a
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problem with school phobia or school avoidance behavior using her diabetes as a
method of missing school on a regular basis." R. 26:69-70. Defendant testified that
she asked that the teachers prepare homework to be sent home and that they refused.
R. 26:59. When asked on cross-examination whether homework was ever picked
up, defendant could only testify that she had picked up the assignments three times.
R. 26:70. She acknowledged that the school personnel had indicated that homework
was not being picked up. Id. When asked whether she ever returned the
homework, defendant stated "I am not sure," suggesting that "Elise returned some
of it when she would go back to school." Id. All of this testimony suggests that
defendant exaggerated both the need for Elise to miss school and defendant's efforts
to work with the school. When asked in summary what education Elise had
received during 1999, defendant conceded, "Very little."
The juvenile court's findings are consistent with the clear weight of all the
evidence presented in this case. Defendant may have made some perfunctory
contacts with the school, but she did not respond to the school's request for her
assistance in securing her daughter^ regular attendance at school.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 53A. STATE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
CHAPTER 11. STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
PART 1. COMPULSORY EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS
Copyright <s> 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 2000 General Session
JA-11-101 Responsibility for minor required to attend school --Penalty for
violation.
(1) For purposes of this part:
(a) "Habitual truant" is a school-age minor who has received more than two
truancy citations within one school year from the school in which the minor
is or should be enrolled and eight absences without a legitimate or valid
excuse or who, in defiance of efforts on the part of school authorities to
resolve a student's attendance problem as required under Section 53A-11103, refuses to regularly attend school or any scheduled period of the
school day.
(b) "Minor" means a person under the age of 18 years.
(c) "Parent" includes:
(i) a custodial parent of the minor;
(ii) a legally appointed guardian of a minor; or
(iii) any other person purporting to exercise any authority over the
minor which could be exercised by persons listed under Subsections
(1)(c)(i) and (ii) above.
(d) "School-age minor" means a minor who has reached the age of six years
but has not reached the age of eighteen years, but does not include a minor
emancipated by marriage.
(e) "Truancy citation" is an administrative notice to a truant minor
requiring an appearance before the school truancy control officer or body
from which the minor is truant. •
(f) "Truant minor" is any school-age minor who is subject to the state's
compulsory education law and who is absent from school without a legitimate
or valid excuse.
(2) A parent shall enroll and send a school-age minor to a public or
regularly established private school during the school year of the district in
/hich the minor resides.
(3) It is a class B misdemeanor for a parent to knowingly:
(a) fail to enroll a school-age minor in school; or
(b) refuse to respond to a written request which is delivered to the parent
pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 53A-11-103(1)(b) by a local school
board or school district.
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to a parent of a school-age
Copr. ® West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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or who has been declared by the local school board to be exempt from school
endance in conformity with Section 53A-11-102.
5) A local board of education or school district shall report violations of
section (3) to the appropriate city, county, or district attorney.
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tory: C. 1953, 53A-11-101, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 2, § 146; 1990, ch. 78, §
1999, ch. 99, § 1.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 53A. STATE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
CHAPTER 11. STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
PART 1. COMPULSORY EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 2000 General Session
3A-11-103 Duties of boards of education in resolving child's attendance
problems --Parental involvement --Issuance of truancy citations --Procedure
for contesting citations --Liability not imposed.
(1) For each school-age minor who is or should be enrolled within that school
istrict, the local school board or school district shall make efforts to
esolve a minor's school attendance problems. Those efforts shall include, as
sasonably feasible:
(a) counseling of the minor by school authorities;
(b) a written request for parental support in securing regular attendance
by the minor delivered by certified mail, containing notice of the
requirements of this section and stating that refusal to respond to the
notice is a class B misdemeanor;
(c) at least one meeting with the minor and the parents;
(d) any necessary adjustment to the curriculum and schedule to meet special
needs of the minor; and
(e) monitoring school attendance of the minor for a period not to exceed 30
days.
(2) In addition to the efforts listed in Subsection (1), the local school
oard or school district may enlist the assistance of community and law
nforcement agencies as appropriate and reasonably feasible.
(3) In the event that the minor's school attendance problem cannot be
esolved by the efforts of the local school board or school district, the local
chool board or school district shall refer the school-age minor to the
.ppropriate district or county attorney or juvenile court as a habitual truant.
(4) Any parent of a school-age minor shall, upon written request from a local
ichool board or school district, cooperate with school authorities in resolving
he minor's school attendance problem.
(5) A local school board may authorize the issuance of truancy citations by
jchool administrators and appointed truancy specialists. Recipients of truancy
:itations may be subjected to administrative penalties, and to a fee assessed
.n accordance with a uniform fee schedule adopted by the State Board of
education.
(6) A local school board that authorizes the issuance of truancy citations
shall establish a procedure for students to contest citations. Any minor having
received three prior truancy citations within a single school year and for whom
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sonable efforts to resolve the attendance problem have failed, shall be
led a habitual truancy citation and referred by the local school board or
:>ol district to the appropriate county or district attorney or juvenile
rt as a habitual truant. Proceedings for habitual truancy shall be expedited
:he court.
7) This section shall not impose any civil liability on boards of education
:heir employees. Proceedings initiated under this part do not obligate or
:lude action by the Division of Child and Family Services under Section
ia-316.
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:ory: C. 1953, 53A-11-103, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 143, § 1; 1990, ch. 78, §
1995, ch. 302, § 4; 1996, ch. 1, § 5; 1999, ch. 99, § 3.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 8a. CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 2000 General Session
7-8a-l

Joinder of offenses and of defendants.

(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same
ndictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the
ffenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their
commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.
(2) (a) When a felony and.misdemeanor are charged together the defendant is
afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor and
felony offenses.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
conduct or in the same criminal episode.
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both
to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more
than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information.
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a
single indictment or information.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate
trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other
relief as justice requires.
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if
the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a
motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce
in evidence at the trial.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I. Courts
CHAPTER 3a. JUVENILE COURTS
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright (c) 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
Current through End of 2000 General Session
78-3a-115 Hearings --Public excluded, exceptions --Victims admitted -Minor's cases heard separately from adult cases --Minor or parents or
custodian heard separately --Continuance of hearing --Consolidation of
proceedings involving more than one minor.
(1) Hearings in minor's cases shall be held before the court without a jury
and may be conducted in an informal manner.
(a) In abuse, neglect, and dependency cases the court shall exclude all
persons who do not have a direct interest in the proceedings.
(b) In delinquency cases the court shall admit all persons who have a
direct interest in the case and may admit persons requested by the parent oi
legal guardian to be present. The court shall exclude all other persons
except as provided in Subsection (1)(c).
(c) In delinquency cases in which the minor charged is 14 years of age or
older, the court shall admit any person unless the hearing is closed by the
court upon findings on the record for good cause if:
(i) the minor has been charged with an offense which would be a felony i:
committed by an adult; or
(ii) the minor is charged with an offense that would be a class A or B
misdemeanor if committed by an adult, and the minor has been previously
charged with an offense which would be a misdemeanor or felony if
committed by an adult.
(d) The victim of any act charged in a petition or information involving a:
offense committed by a minor which if committed by an adult would be a
felony or a class A or class B misdemeanor shall, upon request, be afforded
all rights afforded victims in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse
Procedures Act, Title 77, Chapter 37, Victims' Rights, and Title 77, Chapte
38, Rights of Crime Victims Act. The notice provisions in Section 77-38-3
do not apply to important juvenile justice hearings as defined in Section
77-38-2.
(e) A .victim, upon request to appropriate juvenile court personnel, shall
have the right to inspect and duplicate juvenile court legal records that
have not been expunged concerning:
(i) the scheduling of any court hearings on the petition;
(ii) any findings made by the court; and
(iii) any sentence or decree imposed by the court.
(2) Minor's cases shall be heard separately from adult cases. The minor or
his parents or custodian may be heard separately when considered necessary by
the court. The hearing may be continued from time to time to a date specified
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court order.
(3) When more than one minor is involved in a home situation which may be
und to constitute neglect or dependency, or when more than one minor is
leged to be involved in the same law violation, the proceedings may be
nsolidated, except that separate hearings may be held with respect to
sposition.
story: C. 1953, 78-3a-511, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 1, s 58; 1997, ch. 103, s
renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 365, s 29; 1998, ch. 171, s 8; 1998, ch. 237, s
< General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables >
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
\mendment Notes. --The 1997 amendment by ch. 103, effective May 5, 1997,
ied "or a misdemeanor as provided in Section 77-38-5" in Subsection (2).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 365, effective March 21, 1997, renumbered this
:tion, which formerly appeared as s 78-3a-511, and substituted "shall" for
iy" in the second sentence in Subsection (1)(a).
Che 1998 amendment by ch. 171, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or a class A
class B misdemeanor" in the first sentence of Subsection (1)(b) (Subsection
(d) of the reconciled version), and deleted "or a misdemeanor as provided
Section 77-38-5" in former Subsection (2).
?he 1998 amendment by ch. 237, effective May 4, 1998, rewrote the former
:ond sentence of Subsection (1) (a) as Subsections (1) (a) to (c) ,
lesignating the former first sentence of Subsection (1)(a) as Subsection (1)
I former Subsections (1)(b) and (c) as Subsections (1)(d) and (e); deleted
*mer Subsection (2), incorporating the subject matter into Subsection (1)(c)
I redesignating former Subsections (3) and (4) as (2) and (3).
'his section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research
I General Counsel.
Iffective Dates. --Laws 1996, ch. 1, s 94 makes the act effective on January
1996.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
stitutionality.
struction.
ect interest.
cretion of court.
dence.
sence of juvenile.
sence of witnesses.
all hearing.
sd.
Copr. (C) West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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UTRRCRPRule 12
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Copr. ® West Group 2000. All rights reserved.
Current with amendments received through 10-1-2000.
RULE 12. MOTIONS

(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by
affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The
following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information
other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an
offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the
pendency of the proceeding;
(2) motions to suppress evidence;
(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants;

or

(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later
determination. Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the
court shall state its findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court
shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief
from such waiver.
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all
proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and
conclusions of law as are made orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.

[Amended effective April 1, 1998.]

Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

ADDENDUM B

SchoolNet Management System - san Karaex ur. n i g n
Friday, May 28, 1999

^>W*'5 <^A0>ih x .

Student Attendance Summary
For THOMPSON, ELISE (5986230)
Term T 1 : 08/26/98 To 10/30/98

Lass

Description

Teacher

>00
>43
LOO
)01
>00
)70
)70

BEG FIT 7G
BEG BAND IW
UT HISTORY
TLC/JR
7TH SCIENCE
ENGLISH I
MATH 7

SAUPAN, R.
FARR, T.
DURRANT, C.
WI-CO-BA, D.
JOHNSON, G.
FROST, R.
JOHNSON, G.

Total

Tot T o t 08/26 08/31 09/07 09/14 09/21 09/28 10/05 10/12 10/19 10/26 Y T D Y T D YTD
Abs T d y MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF M T W R F M T W R F MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF M T W R F A b s T d y Enr
24
24
24
24
25
26
28
0
175

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

X..PX
X.. PX
X.. PX
X.. PX
X..PX
XX. PX
XX.PX

X.P. .X. .X X
X.P. .X. .X X
X.P. .X. .X X
X.P. .X. .X X
XEP. .X. .X X
XEP. .X. .X X
XEP. EX. .X X..X.

PPPXX
PPPXX
PPPXX
PPPXX
PPPXX
PPPXX
PPPXX

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.p
.p
.p
.p
.p
.p
.p

P.PPP
P.PPP
P.PPP
P.PPP
P.PPP
P.PPP
P.PPP

X. .XX XPX..
X. .XX XPX..
X. .XX XPX..
X. .XX XPX..
X. .XX XPX..
X. .XX XPX..
X. .XX XPX..

24
24
24
24
25
26
28
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

45
45
45
45
45
45
45
0

175

0

45

Student Attendance Summary
For THOMPSON, ELISE (5986230)
Term T2:11/02/98 To 01/15/99
Class

Description

Teacher

7600
1643
6100
8001
3200
4070
5070

BEG FIT 1G
BEG BAND IW
UT HISTORY
TLC/JR
7TH SCIENCE
ENGLISH I
MATH 7

SAUPAN, R.
FARR, T.
DURRANT, C.
WI-CO-BA, D.
JOHNSON, G.
FROST, R.
JOHNSON, G.

Total

Tot Tot 11/02 11/09 11/16 11/23 11/30 12/07 12/14 12/21 12/28 01/04 01/11 YTD Y T D Y T D
Abs Tdy MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF M T W R F MTWRF MTWRF Abs T d y E n r
38
38
37
38
39
38
39
0
267

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

.PX
.PX
.PX
EPX
EPX
EPX
EPX

P
P
P
P
P
P
P

XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX

PXXSX
PXXEX
PXXEX
PXXEX
PXXEX
PXXEX
PXXEX

..
..
..
..
..
..
..

PX.
PX.
PX.
PX.
PX.
PX.
PX.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

. PXXXX
. PXXXX
. PXXXX
. PXXXX
. PXXXX
. PXXXX
. PXXXX

XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX

XXX
XXX
XXX
XXX
XXX
XXX
XXX

XPXXX
XPXXX
XPXXX
XPXXX
XPXXX
XPXXX
XPXXX

XXXXX
XXXXX

xxxx.
xxxx.
XXXXX

xxxx.
XXXXX

62
62
61
62
64
64
67
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

90
90
90
90
90
90
90
0

442

0

90

SchoolNet Management System - San Rafael Jr. High
Friday, May 28, 1999
Student Attendance Summary
For THOMPSON, ELISE (5986230)
Term T3: 01/18/99 To 03/19/99
21 ass

Description

Teacher

4060
164 3
6100
3200
1100
4071
5071

READING
BEG BAND IW
UT HISTORY
7TH SCIENCE
VA FOUND I
ENGLISH I
MATH 7

DURRANT, C.
FARR, T.
DURRANT, C.
JOHNSON, G.
DOOLEY, D.
FROST, R.
JOHNSON, G.

Tot Tot 01/18 01/25 02/01 02/08 02/15 02/22 03/01 03/08 03/15 YTD YTD YTD
Abs Tdy MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF Aba Tdy Enr
35
41
18
35
24
10
38
0

Total

201

0 XXXXX
0 XXXXX
0 XXXXX
0 XXXXX
0 XXXXX
0 XXXXX
0 XXXXX
o
0

XXXXX XXXX.
XXXXX XX.XX
XXXXX XX...
XXXX. XXX.X
XXX.. XXX..
XXX.. ..X
XXX.. XXXX.

XXXX.
XXXX.
X. .X.
XX.X.
XXXX.
XXXX.

X.XX XX.XX
XXXX XXXXX
XXXX
.XX. .XXXX
..X. ...XX

XXXXX ...XX .X.XX 97
X.XXX XXXXX XXXXX 103
79
X.XX. XXXXX XXXXX 97
.X..X .X.XX ..X.. 88
X
74
.XXX XXXXX XXXX. XXXXX XXXXX 105
0
643

0 134
0 134
0 134
0 134
0 134
0 134
0 134
0
0
0 134

1

r^

'

JV

/ ^

age

Attendance Student History - San Rafael Jr. High

rtDate: 12/15/1099
TtTimc: 15 45 24
Student Name

M/F

Birthdate

Age

Thompson, EliseD [1528]

F

12/21/1985

13

Track/School/Year
A 4081999/00

Entry
08/25/1999

Advisor
<Unassigned>,

Grade
8

Group
Currently active students

Exit

I Term/Track : Term 1 [08/25/1999-10/29/1999] - A 408 99/00
Term Totals based on Apportion Flag
Excused

Unexcused

151
8
Course/Section

Tardy
0

42
8

8

8

8

8

8

8

8

9

2 3 2 4 2 5 26 2 7 2 8 2 9 3 0 31

9
1

9
2

9
3

9
4

9
5

9
6

9
7

9

9

9

10

10

10

8

9

1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 14 1 5 16 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9 3 0

1

2

3

I

E

E

E

E

2NGLISH 8

E

E

E

E

E

SCIENCE 8

E

E

E

E

E

^ACS 8

E

E

E

E

E

J S HISTORY

E

E

E

E

E

JENERAL CRAFT

E

E

E

E

E

>RE-ALGEBRA A

E

E

E

E

E

SPANISH

Non S c h o o l
H a l f Day

Day

Doctor's Excuse
In School Suspension
Phone Report
Unexcused
Suspended

A
E
M
S
V

Not Scheduled
Activity
Excused
Half Day Morning
Sluff
Vacation
<Unset>

**
**

C
H
N
T
X

9

9

9

E
E
E
E
E
E
E

9

E
E
E
E
E
E
E

9

9

E

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

E

E

E
E
E
E
E
E

E
E
E
E
E
E

Present
Check In/Out
Homebound
Half Day Afternoon
Tardy
Absent

ATTSTHST - Version

3.0.20

1
I

Student Name
Thompson, EliseD [1528]

M/F
F

Birthdate
12/21/1985

Track/School/Year

Advisor

Entry

A 408 1999/00

<Unassigned>,

08/25/1999

Age
13

Grade

Group

8

Currently active students

I

Exit

I Term/Track : Term 1 [08/25/1999-10/29/1999] - A 408 99/00
Term Totals based on Apportion Flag
Excused

Course/Section

10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

I

E

P

E

P

SCIENCE

E

P

FACS 8

E

P

U S HISTORY

E

P

GENERAL CRAFT

E

P

PRE-ALGEBRA A

E

P

8

0

42

ENGLISH 8

SPANISH

Tardy

Unexcused

151

**
*#
*«
**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

E

E

E

E

E

U

U

IJ

E

E

E

E

E

U

U

E

E

E

E

E

U

U

E

E

E

E

E

U

U

E

E

E

E

E

U

U

E

E

E

E

E

U

U

E

E

E

E

E

U

U

u
u
u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u
u
u
u

E

E

U

U

E

E

U

U

E

E

U

U

E

E

U

U

E

E

U

U

E

E

U

U

E

E

U

U

E

iod Totals
esent (.)
excused (U)

Excused (E)

= 122

144

Phone Report (P)

= 42

Non School Day
Half Day
Doctor's Excuse
In School Suspension
Phone Report
Unexcused
Suspended

A
E
M
S
V

Not Scheduled
Activity
Excused
Half Day Morning
Sluff
Vacation
<Unset>

Present
Check In/Out
Homebound
Half Day Afternoon
Tardy
Absent

I

ortDate: 01/17/2000
ortTime: 09:05:51
1

A
<

I

« /

Attendance Student History - San Rafael Jr. High
Student Name
Thompson, EliseD [1528]

M/F
F

Birthdate
12/21/1985

Track/School/Year

Advisor

Entry

A 408 1999/00

<Unassigned>,

08/25/1999

Age Grade
14
8

Group

I

Currently active students

Exit

I Term/Track : Term 2 [11/01/1999-01/14/2000] - A 408 99/00
I Term Totals based on Apportion Flag
Excused
27
Course/Section
ENGLISH 8
ENGLISH 8
SERVICE LEARNING
SCIENCE 8
FACS 8
U S HISTORY
PRE-ALGEBRA A

Non School Day
Half Day
Doctor's Excuse
In School Suspension
Phone Report
Unexcused
Suspended

Tardy

Unexcused

I

0

175

11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
~ 3
" 4* ~ ~ ~ 8
~ 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
TT

—
u u u ** u
**
u u u ** u
u u u ** u
u u u ** u
u u u ** u

--

A

e

M

s
V

u u u u u
u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

Not S c h e d u l e d
Activity
Excused
Half Day Morning
Sluff
Vacat i o n
<Unset>

u u u u u
u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

.

C
H
N
T
X

u u u *«

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

**
**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**
**

u u u u u

u u u u u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

u
u
u
u

Present
Check In/Out
Homebound
H a l f Day A f t e r n o o n
Tardy
Absent

ATTSTHST - Version 3.0.20

Student Name
Thompson, Elise D [1528]

M/F

Birthdate

Age

Grade

Group

F

12/21/1985

14

8

Currently active students

Track/School/Year

Advisor

A 408 1999/00

<Unassigned>,

Entry
08/25/1999

Exit

TermfTrack : Term 2 [11/01/1999-01/14/2000] - A 408 99/00
Term Totals based on Apportion Flag
Excused

Unexcused

27
Course/Section
ENGLISH 8
ENGLISH 8
SERVICE LEARNING
SCIENCE 8
FACS 8
U S HISTORY
PRE-ALGEBRA A

Tardy

175

12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1
13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1

--

u u u u u
u u u u u
u u u u u
u u u u u
u u u u u

**
E - _ __ **
__
**
**
E
__ **
E
**
E
**
E

b*

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

* *

* *

*4

1
2

1
3

T
E
E

* * ** ** ** **
** ** ** ** **
** ** ** ** **

E
E

1
4

1
5

1
6

1
7

1
8

1

E

E

E
E

E
E

•

u

E
E

E
E

E
E

u
u

1 1 1 1 1
9 10 11 12 13 14
U

'i""y a1"

U

E
E
E
E

u u
u

U

u u
u u

riod Totals
at Scheduled (--) * 89
lexcused (U) • 175

Non School Day
Half Day
Doctor's Excuse
In School Suspension
Phone Report
Unexcused
Suspended

Present

-A
E
M
S
V

(.)

Not Scheduled
Activity
Excused
Half Day Morning
Sluff
Vacation
<Unset>

Excused (S)

24

C
H
N
T
X

• 27

Present
Check In/Out
Homebound
Half Day Afternoon
Tardy
Absent

ATTSTHST - Version 3 0.20

8

0

Emery County School District sw«,su*
First Excessive Absence Citation
(First, second, and third unexcused absences)
Student's Name: /Fji*>^

~Th{M&<;*»1

Grade:,

School: S^tf

/tft&f/

<Jr- PtjA

Date of First Unexcused Absence:
£8
Q
Q

/f //^f/^y

All Day
Partial Day - Classes:
Individual Class:

Teacher:

Date of Second Unexcused Absence:
J3
Q
Q

$
Q
Q

/ / 7 / y / / f

All Day
Partial Day - Classes:
Individual Class:

Date of Third Unexcused Absence.
All Day
Partial Day - Classes:
Individual Class:

Date: J///fff

Teacher^
////

//^f

Teacher:

This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student has three (3) unexcused
absences. State law requires the parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular
attendance of their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being
filed against the parent/guardian.
District policy requires that one or both parents/guardians attend a meeting with the school
principal/assistant principal to discuss their students attendance problem before the student is
allowed to return to school. Please contact the school as soon as possible to schedule a date and

Signature

Q?4t*A
/2?/<

SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION

COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY

• Complete items 1, 2, and 3 Also complete
item 4 if Restncted Delivery is desired
• Pnnt your name and address on the reverse
so that we can return the card to you
• Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece,
or on the front if space permits

A

Received by (Please Pnnt Clearly)

C

Signature

1

Date of Delivery

//- * 3-fo
a Agent
Addressee
D Is»delivery
delivery addcess-different
addces^c-ifferent ffroVrjytem 1 ? U Yes
Q No
If YES enter delivery address below

Article Addressed to

tot

B

Wl

3 Service Type
^Certified Mail
D Registered
Q Insured Mail

Q Express Mail
• Return Receipt for Merchandise
DCOO

4 Restncted Delivery'' (Extra Fee)
2 Article Number (Copy from service label)

l^o ooi-

PS Form 3 8 1 1 , July 1999

Domestic Return Receipt

Z 320

002

^5"^

US2

US Postal Service

Receipt for Certified Mail
No Insurance Coverage Provided
Do not use for International Mail (See reverse)
1

Sent to
Street & Number
Post Office State & ZIP Code

Postage

$

63

Certified Fee

I HO

Speoal Delivery Fee
Restncted Dekvery Fee
Return Receipt Showing to
Whom & Pate Oehvered

^y

Return Reeapt Showmg to Whom
Qate& Addressees Address

I

TOTAL Postage* fees
Postmark or Oate

N

I

£1

/

ii2£
^ \

v

Q Yes

102595 99-M 1789

San Rafael Junior High
Merlin Weber, Principal

N«W fcu,i-j.
Phone (435) 384-2335
Fax (435) 384-3354

P.O. Box 790
Ferron, Utah 84523
November 15,1999
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Thompson
I'm concerned that Elise is still not attending school, and that you don't call to excuse her
anymore. On the days that you don't call to excuse her, if we can't contact you by phone, she
has an unexcused absence. Because of new school attendance laws, it becomes necessary for us
to issue a truancy citation when students have unexcused absences. Because of so many
unexcused absences, she's at the point that she should be referred to court for that problem alone.
I would like to workout an arrangement and get Elise in school. You have a responsibility to get
her to school and I have a responsibility to report when she doesn't attend. I believe that there
must be some way to solve the problem. As I've told you before, we've had students with
serious diabetic problems that we've been able to accommodate with the help and direction of
the parents. Since you live so close, you'd be able to get here quickly when she has problems we
can't handle. Elise has missed so much school that it's going to be difficult for her to return
now, but we'll do everything we can to help her. Please come in and lets talk about how to
solve the problem.
Sincerely

Merlin Weber

,02

^

d

Certified Mail

COMPLETE THIS SEC770A/ ON DELIVERY

I SECTION
^. Also complete
(is desired.
is on the reverse
. . von return the card to you.
"• Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece,
or on the front if space permits.
1. Article Addressed to:

A. Received by (Please Print Clearly) 8. Date of Delivery

C. Signature
O Agent
Addressee
0. Is
is delivery
delivery addre^differjBnt Trowwem 17 u res
If YES, enter delivery address below:
O No

3. Service Type
^Certified Mail
Q Registered
O Insured Mail

D Express Mail
• Return Receipt for Merchandise
Q C.0.0.

4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee)

Q Yes

2. Article Number (Copy from service label)

'%2-GT 60^
PS Form 3 8 1 1 .July 1999

Domestic Return Receipt

¥^2
102595-99-M-1789

San Rafael Junior High
Merlin Weber, Principal

Phone(435)384-2335
Fax (435) 384-3354
P.O. Box 790
Ferron, Utah 84523

November 24,1999
Dear Valery
I've talked with the teachers about the homework, and they will get an assignment for Monday,
but then they want you to return it to them for correction before they prepare more. That would
mean that you'd have to come by school each afternoon to either pick up homework or drop it
off. I hope this will help.
Please remember that if you don't call in to excuse Elise, her attendance records show an
unexcused absence. Also, we were supposed to have doctor's notes for each absence.
Sincerely

Merlin Weber

Emery County School District
Second Excessive Absence Citation
(Fourth, fifth, and sixth unexcused absences)
Student's Name: &(\A ?
School: ^^j/j/l

~JJl./f$fp

^C7/l

Grade:_

Kj/ztl/

Date:

/I

Date of Fourth Unexcused Absence:
^ L All Day
Q Partial Day - Classes:
Q

Individual Class:

Date of Fifth Unexcused Absence:
j& All Day
Q Partial Day - Classes:
•
Individual Class:
Date of Sixth Unexcused Absence:
$C All Day
Q Partial Day - Classes:
Q Individual Class:

Teacher:_
//' /,p ^/& &

Teacher^

'//tf/ff

/

Teacher:

This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student now has six (6) unexcused
absences. State law requires the parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular
attendance of their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being
filed against the parent/guardian.

&

COMMENT(S):

{JzHJ,

~^7SA€44/Z&
TiUe:

sT*^'Zfe'^^^stJ'^JZSy/^L

S E N D E R : COMPLETE

THIS

COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY

SECTION

Complete items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired.
Pnnt your name and address on the reverse
so that we can return the card to you.
Attach this card to the back of the maiipiece,
or on the front if space permits.
1. Article Addressed to:

A. Received by (Please Pnnt Clearly) B. Date of Delivery

C. Signature

x

D Agent

UbW

^ii^l(VQAddressee

0 Is delivery address diffi
If YES, ente/ deli

3. Service Type
D Certified Mail
• Registered
D Insured Mail

itfrom^§n1?
Idress below:

G Express Mail
D Return Receipt for Merchandise
D C.O.D.

4. Restncted Delivery7 (Extra Fee)
2. Article Number (Copy from service label)

PS Form 3 8 1 1 , July 1999

D Yes
• No

D Yes

32^/ o*-^ i/$j
Domestic Return Receipt

IO2595-99-M-I789

San Rafael Junior High
Merlin Weber, Principal

svu* &u»t- «
Phone (435) 384-2335
Fax (435)384-3354

P.O. Box 790
Ferron, Utah 84523

December 1,1999
Dear Valerie
Julie said that when you came yesterday you talked about changing Elise's schedule. We can do
that, but we need to sit down and work out the details. I know that we talked about this already a
long time ago, but it was my understanding that we would decide this together with the help of
the counselor and the teachers involved. That's the way it needs to happen. I know that
everyone here will do anything to help get Elise back in school. Please call for a time to come in
and work out a schedule that will work for Elise.
Elise has three more unexcused absences also. That makes it necessary to issue another truancy
citation. Please call the school when you're keeping Elise home. You also need to get doctors
notes for the days you keep her home.
Sincerely

Merlin Weber

Emery County School District
Third Excessive Absence Citation
(Seventh and eighth unexcused absences)
Student's Name: ^//^^f^
School: -&&AA

/^j/&</
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•
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Date:
//{h\}*.
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Individual Class:

Date of Eighth Unexcused Absence: j / ^ / > ^ % f
Ijaf All Day
•
Partial Day - Classes:
•
Individual Class:

fT

Teacher:
/ /

Teacher:

This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student now has eight (8) unexcused
absences and in accordance with Utah State Code 53 A-11-103, the above named student is being
referred to juvenile court.
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130 North Main • Box 120 • Huntington, Utah S452S
(435) 687-9846 Fax (435) 687-9849

Date:

December 11/ 1998

BOARD MEMBERS
Royd Haa,
President
Marie Johnson,
Vice President
Roger Su/eruon
Laurel JsiKznscn
Sharman Seamons

ADMINISTRATION*
Kirk L Sitterud,
Superintendent
Ross Huntington,
Business
Administrator
Jon Crawford,
Director of
Student Services
Edward R Clark,
Supervisor of
Applied Technology

J. J. Gram;
Supervisor of
Secondary Education
Sid Lancaster,
Supervisor of
Elementary Education
Jeneane Warren,
Director of
School Food Service

Dear Parent(s)
Elise Thompson's
attendance problem has not been resolved.
The school has made an earnest and persistent effort to have your child in reauired
attendance. Utah State law clearly requires all children to attend school and also
requires parents and school personnel to work with the courts if problems surface which'
cannot be resolved.
Since we were unable to resolve the attendance problem at the school or district level, we
had no alternative but to refer you to the Mediation Council which includes
representation from the Division of Child and Family Services, Emery County School
District, Local Interagency Council, and the Juvenile Court.
Your mediation appointment is set for:

Date: December 16/ 1998
Location:

45 g f

Time

1Q:45 (there may h=> a short
wait.)
IQQ S t / Castlft Dale, TTf.. (Fnnr Pmirnprs'Mental Health)

If you do not attend this mediation meeting, a referral will be made to the Juvenile Court
for truaflgy.
Sincerely,

Ralph Uon,
Supervisor of
Transportation
Mike Huntsman,
Supervisor of
Buildings and Grounds
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1 |

APPEARANCES

2
3 | For the State:
4 |

Mr. Brent Langston
Assistant Emery County Attorney
P.O. Box 249
Castle Dale, UT 84513

5
6 I For the Defendant:
7|

Mr. Keith H. Chiara
Attorney at Law
98N.400E.
Price, UT 84501

8
9
PROCEEDINGS
10

11
THE COURT: I show that we have two trials back to back here. Which

12
one do you want to do first?

13
MR- LANGSTON: I was going to ask Your Honor how the court wants to

14
proceed? It is the same witnesses and we can a

ally proceed with both of them

15
together or we can do it separate. However the court desires to do it.

16
THE COURT: Well, there is no sense hearing from them twice, but.

17
MR. LANGSTON: That is my feeling.
18
MR. CHIARA: Are we trying Elise's truancy? Is that what is going on?
19
THE COURT: Yes.
20
MR. LANGSTON: Yes. Right
21
THE COURT: Do you have any objections taking all the testimony at once
22
and then we can separate at argument?
23
MR. CHIARA: That is okay. I have been informed by the prosecutor
24
though that the court had already determined that Elise was truant That all earnest
25
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1

and persistent efforts had been made. I had just assumed that decision had already

2

been made in a previous hearing.

3

THE COURT: No, what happened is Elise had a truancy last year and

4

there was a diversion and it was determined that she had not complied with the terms

5

of the diversion but I believe that a new petition was filed or we still back on the old

6

deal?

7

MR. LANGSTON: The way I understand it is then we reinstated the old

8

petition, the old, because the court has already ruled in the December hearing that the

9

terms of the diversion were not complied with so that was set aside and we are now

10

back to where was originally with that petition with the truancy. The court has not

11

made a determination whether she was in fact truant or not, just that a diversion

12

agreement was not complied with.

13

MR. CHIARA: Right

14

MR. LANGSTON: So we are here, as I understand it, for trial on that

15

original truancy and that also on the new charges that we filed against Valerie for the

16

failure to comply with the compulsory education laws. Those are the two matters that

17

I understand we are at trial on.

18

THE COURT: What period of time is the truancy for? That is the critical

19 question.
20

MR. LANGSTON: That would be up until December 18th, I think is the

21

way it was filed of last, of 1998. And that was filed by Miss Manley back then and

22

that was originally diverted. Then we filed the new charges against Valerie that has to

23

do with the period up until from this school year up until basically when the charges

24

were filed in December.

25

MR. CHIARA: See these are part of the reasons I was asking this court to
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1

continue this. To give me time to know just what is going on and be prepared on that.

2

I haven't (inaudible).

3

THE COURT: Just a minute. Let me straighten this out, because I don't

4

think Mr. Langston'srighton this. On the 6th of January we took an arraignment on

5

a new truancy charge, incident number four. The original truancy was incident

6

number one. And so the new truancy charge was denied, set for trial today, and that

7

the critical date there is November 29th of '99.

8
9

Incident number one, the original truancy charge is still out there. I assumed that
if we took care of the new truancy that the other one would go away, but that has

10

never been said. So we have a truancy on Elise, a new truancy, that is incident

11

number four, even though it says on the docket that it is one.

12

THE CLERK: (Inaudible) it was denied and the assistant county attorney

13 (inaudible).
14

THE COURT: Oh, alright, then Mr. Langston is right

15

THE CLERK: It hasn't been.

16

THE COURT: Let me back up, Mr. Chiara. The first incident number

17

one was the first truancy that was diverted. She failed the diversion. It is now on trial

18 today. Incident number four was the second truancy, it was denied on the 6th of
19

January and not set for trial. It has gone to the county attorney's office for screening.

20

So that is what we are here on, incident number one, and then the parents information.

21

So let's...

22

MR. CHIARA: All I have in my hands, it looks like, is number four for

23

November 29th of 499. I would request if the court, if the prosecutor is going to

24

prosecute on that that we be allowed to put on evidence as to whether earnest and

25

persistent efforts were made to complied with that diversion agreement There is a
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1

witness here that I think can testify to the court that earnest and persistent efforts were

2

made.

3
4

THE COURT: The issue about the diversion agreement is behind us.
That is res judicata.

5

MR. CHIARA: I understand except that my client that Mrs. Thompson

6

tells me that she thought it was just a review hearing on how things were going. She

7

wasn't aware that it was a matter where...

8

THE COURT: She was here and she had it explained to her what it was

9

about. We are not going to litigate things twice. The trial will be on whether or not

10

the incident number one9 the truancy, is well taken or not. Not whether the diversion

11

agreement was complied with. That's...

12
13
14

MR. CHIARA: Can I have a copy of that then because I don't even have a
copy of it.
THE COURT: Yes, we can make one in the course of things. I am not

15

going to slow down here where we are already an hour late. All it says is it is a

16

typical truancy language and the critical date is December 18,1998.

17

MR. CHIARA: 1998.

18

MR. LANGSTON: 1998.

19

MR. CHIARA: 498.

20

THE COURT: And in the course of while we are getting started we will

21

have this copied and give you a copy of it.

22

MR. CHIARA: Excuse me, Your Honor, I have found a copy of it.

23

THE COURT: Okay. Alright, anything, any more preliminary stuff before

24
25

we get started here?
MR. LANGSTON: No, we are prepared to..
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1 I

THE COURT: Okay, go ahead Mr. Langston.

2

MR. LANGSTON: We will first call Merlin Webber.

3

THE COURT: Now we are handling both fact patterns.

4

MR. LANGSTON: Yes.

5

THE COURT: And we will differentiate between them all at closing

6
7 I

statement.
MR. LANGSTON: Correct.

8
9 |

MR. MERLIN Webber

10
11 I called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiflf being first duly sworn by the
12 I Clerk of the Court was examined and testified as follows:
13
14 I
15

EXAMINATION
BY MR. LANGSTON:

16

Q. Would you please state your name and where you are employed?

17

A. I am Merlin Webber. I am the principal at San Rafael Junior High.

18

Q. How long have you been a principal there?

19

A. This is my third year,

20

Q. Are you familiar with a student named Elise Thompson?

21

A. Yes.

22

Q. Andwhyisthat?

23

A. Well, I have known her, I have known the family for a long time, but she is a

24
25

student at our school.
Q. Okay. Calling your attention to the school year beginning in 1998, in the fall

